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Backlash against Welfare Mothers: Past and Present. By Ellen Reese. Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2005. Pp. 372. $50.00 (cloth); $19.95 (paper).
Ellen Reese has written an important book on welfare policy that is very much
reminiscent of the classic by Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward, Regulating
the Poor: The Functions of Public Welfare (New York: Pantheon, 1971). Both books
are elegantly written, theoretically sophisticated, historically informed, empiri-
cally rich, and politically pertinent in providing a much-needed political eco-
nomic critique of welfare policy. Reese’s book resembles Piven and Cloward’s
in these many ways but for the irony that Reese explicitly states early on in her
narrative: her analysis is designed to show where Piven and Cloward got it wrong
about U.S. welfare politics in the post–World War II era. As a result, she argues
that their analysis limits our ability to make sense of the more recent backlash
against women on welfare that came to a head in the 1990s.
Whereas Piven and Cloward famously argued that welfare was a secondary
institution calibrated to serve the social control needs of the political economy,
Reese writes, “Piven and Cloward’s analysis oversimplifies business interests re-
garding welfare, failing to capture significant variations in the views of business
leaders. Nor do Piven and Cloward provide a clear analysis of the mechanisms
through which business interests become expressed in welfare policies and in-
teract with racial and gender politics. American welfare policies, after all, reg-
ulate not only the labor market, but also gender and race relations” (29–30).
Reese compounds this scholarly criticism with the political critique that Piven
and Cloward, as leaders of the National Welfare Rights Organization (NWRO),
pushed for a national guaranteed income in the late 1960s and early 1970s, but,
when that failed, they had helped marginalize the welfare poor by not forging
coalitions with other groups. As a result, Reese argues, they left a political vacuum
that was filled by a growing reservoir of mass resentment for the expanded
population of welfare recipients. This resentment would eventually be tapped
by right-wing propagandists in their quest to mobilize mass support for welfare
reform.
Reese argues that ideologically conservative and low-wage employers led the
backlash against welfare in the 1940s and 1950s. They used race and gender bias
to demonize welfare recipients in the eyes of the broader public, building support
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for welfare restrictions, especially in the South, in the form of “suitable home”
and “employable mother” rules (40). Reese further argues that this backlash even-
tually took hold on the national level in the wake of the failure of the push for
a guaranteed income. A sustained campaign using propaganda, especially from
right-wing think tanks, resulted in the welfare retrenchment that came in the form
of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996
(U.S. Public Law 104-193). The act abolished Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) and replaced it with Temporary Assistance for Needy Families.
Reese begins with a recounting of how welfare reform in the current period
has succeeded politically in no small part by fanning the flames of racial re-
sentment and gender backlash. In order to understand the current nationally
driven retrenchment, though, Reese suggests we must look back to the earlier
one, in which states led the way and the federal government tended mostly to
go along. Federal complicity stemmed from the desire of national policy makers
and administrators to prevent welfare from impeding their attempts to institu-
tionalize the preferred social security system. But federal officials were uneven
in their complicity, eventually working at times to strike down state attempts to
limit access to AFDC. With time, the welfare rolls grew to include more nonwhite
single mothers, and opposition to welfare became more strident.
Reese provides a variety of data to substantiate her thesis. She begins with a
multivariate logistic regression analysis that predicts which states would adopt by
1960 either the suitable home or the employable mother rules. She finds that
lower income states with high demand for agricultural labor and large farms, as
well as those states that had welfare populations with high proportions of nonwhite
recipients, were more likely to adopt either of these rules. This uneven support
for welfare cutbacks shows, according to Reese, that the retrenchment of the 1940s
and 1950s was more pronounced in states where low-wage employers could use
race and gender bias to greater effect in gaining support for the cutbacks.
Reese triangulates her multivariate analysis with paired case studies of state
backlash in the southern states of Georgia and Kentucky and the nonsouthern
states of California and New York. Each case study adds detail and complexity
to the picture, further underscoring the fact that the uneven nature of the
welfare backlash was dependent upon a number of variables, including the
extent to which there was a low-wage economy that could profit from employing
welfare recipients and the extent to which race and gender could be used to
demonize the welfare population enough to push through restrictions. Georgia
was such a place, but Kentucky was less so. This was in part because liberal
Democrats loyal to the New Deal still had sufficient standing in the state leg-
islature at that time to resist conservative initiatives. Further, “racialized oppo-
sition to welfare was more limited in Kentucky than elsewhere in the South”
(84), in no small part because blacks were only 7 percent of the state’s population
in 1950 and only 15 percent of all AFDC recipients.
California had a substantial portion of its large agricultural sector join with
taxpayer associations to lobby for restrictions that could lower the costs of wel-
fare, and racial resentments did play a role in driving retrenchment. But Reese
notes that racial resentment was less influential in California than in many other
states. California had a strong urban and liberal political base, and the African
American population was still relatively small (only 16 percent of AFDC cases
in 1948). Most low-wage farm laborers were Mexicans, who were a small pro-
portion of welfare cases and more often relied on “migrant relief” (94) from
county offices. New York resisted a welfare backlash in part because it, too, had
a strong urban liberal constituency that could turn back most, but not all, of
the draconian restrictions that more conservative policy makers pushed on be-
half of low-wage employers.
Book Reviews 203
After discussing the failure of the guaranteed income effort by the NWRO
during the Nixon presidency, Reese indicates how Presidents Gerald Ford and
Jimmy Carter made subsequent, failed proposals along these lines. This political
stalemate left the door open to the rise of the right and its general push to roll
back the welfare state. Welfare became a casualty of this broader campaign that
used race and gender backlash to mobilize support for its program of retrench-
ment. Reese details how the right reframed the debate such that liberals were
given very few opportunities to resist the discourse of demonization. Instead,
Bill Clinton, a so-called New Democrat, claimed he could help bring about the
“end of welfare as we know it” (William J. Clinton, “Acceptance Speech to the
Democratic National Convention by Governor Bill Clinton from Arkansas” [ad-
dress delivered at the Democratic National Convention, New York, July 16,
1992]). Clinton signed welfare reform into law, ending public assistance as an
entitlement to poor single mothers and instead leading to a system that em-
phasizes moving these mothers as quickly as possible into the low-wage jobs of
the globalizing economy. Employers like Wal-Mart and others, which were grow-
ing through such an economy, became champions of welfare reform and helped
to make it a reality.
Reese concludes with a critique of liberal timidity and a call for bold proposals
in the name of a new New Deal that, like Franklin Roosevelt’s old New Deal
during the Great Depression, provides real aid to working families so that they
can raise their children without having to endure the hardships of poverty. Her
proposals make much sense, and so does her analysis, at least for the most part.
I do, nonetheless, have a number of concerns.
First, I feel that Reese’s book should be read more as a paean to Piven and
Cloward than as a critique. As I mentioned at the outset, Backlash against Welfare
Mothers is remarkably similar to Regulating the Poor. This is true not just of its
politics and theoretical perspective but also of its style. Both books offer a com-
pelling analysis, grounded in a strong historical perspective and founded on a
rich empirical base, to speak eloquently to the political struggle over welfare,
then (when Regulating the Poor appeared in 1971) and now (when reform is
shifting people from being the welfare poor to being the working poor). Both
books represent an important genre of welfare policy research that uses history
and theory to contextualize the analysis of empirical research in such a way that
welfare policy is considered in light of the changing political economy.
Second, Reese’s critique that Piven and Cloward failed to differentiate business
interests and did not identify low-wage employers as the main proponents of
welfare retrenchment rings hollow with me for a number of reasons. The mul-
tivariate analysis of the state retrenchment in the 1940s and the 1950s is strong
but less than definitive. Summary statistics for the models tested are not provided,
leaving the reader to wonder about the robustness of the results presented. In
addition, the fact that states with more agriculture workers and large farms were
more likely to adopt certain restrictions does not in and of itself automatically
mean that all low-wage employers were more interested in welfare retrenchment
than other business interests are. What about low-wage employers other than
those associated with agriculture? Reese does not provide enough labor market
measures to help us decide that question. Further, Reese overlooks the fact that
Piven and Cloward themselves specified that welfare would be calibrated to the
needs of the local political economy. In fact, Piven and Cloward went so far as
to note that, in the South, with its agrarian economy of the 1940s and 1950s,
welfare provision would be even more limited to ensure the continuing avail-
ability of the largely black sharecropping workforce.
But, more seriously, Reese’s problem here is that she does not follow Piven
and Cloward’s mode of analysis enough; she fails to sufficiently contextualize
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her statistical evidence. As a result, she does not see that welfare restrictions
may be calibrated to the needs of the low-wage labor market but in ways that
serve the overall interests of a capitalist political economy. The exploitation of
welfare recipients to feed the need for low-wage labor redounds to the advantage
of the entire political economy. Such exploitation brings an influx of low-wage
labor; the less employers pay for low-wage labor, the greater their profits. In
addition, cutting back on welfare sends a strong signal to the laboring classes
that the state will be less supportive in sheltering workers from the vagaries of
the capitalistic economy. So, even if states with high agricultural employment
and many large farms were more likely to adopt welfare restrictions than were
other states with less agriculture and fewer farms, it could still be that welfare
retrenchment was supported by business interests. In fact, Reese’s own narrative
shows that a variety of economic actors supported cracking down on welfare
recipients in the early decades of AFDC.
The second part of Reese’s critique, that Piven and Cloward fail to show how
race and gender resentments could be mobilized to push through welfare re-
form, is a bit anachronistic. Reese does a good job of showing that indeed race
and gender resentments were critical resources to be tapped in the push to
generate mass support for reform. But she is writing in a time after much
scholarship has highlighted the need to consider race and gender along with
class in understanding the mechanisms of oppression in modern society. In
Regulating the Poor, Piven and Cloward gave less stress to this, to be sure, but it
was definitely part of their story. Note, for example, their extended discussion
of poor, nonwhite, female-headed families and their intense involvement with
them at the time through the NWRO. Piven and Cloward were doing nothing
if they were not writing about and working with low-income women of color to
resist the ways in which welfare policies systematically worked to keep those
women down. Implicit in their work, therefore, are the acknowledgments that
welfare performs social control functions for the capitalistic political economy
and that this control works through race and gender relations, which buttress
the system’s oppressiveness for particular poor families.
In any case, these differences fade when Reese turns to the current period
of national welfare retrenchment. At this point, the role of low-wage employers
is still part of her story but is less distinctive, as they are lumped in with the
other business interests that worked with right-wing think tanks to push for
the abolition of AFDC. Reese again does a good job of showing how race and
gender bias were mobilized to convince the public to champion welfare re-
trenchment. But in the years since Piven and Cloward wrote Regulating the
Poor, their coauthored work and Piven’s own writings have joined with others
in agreement on this point.
Last, I find most unconvincing the political critique that the failure of the
NWRO’s push for a guaranteed income marginalized welfare activism and, by-
passing the opportunity to forge broader alliances with other coalition partners,
left the field of welfare politics open to those who wanted to push through
retrenchment. Piven and Cloward noted in Poor People’s Movements: Why They
Succeed, How They Fail (New York: Pantheon, 1977) how the NWRO in fact tried
hard to build coalitions with other groups only to be spurned, especially by
organized labor. Further, it is important to note that the NWRO’s success in
helping create the growth of the welfare state actually produced the backlash
of powerful capitalist interests. This, by the way, was a backlash that Piven and
Cloward predicted would inevitably come as the powerful tired of making con-
cessions to quell protest from below. The goal of Piven and Cloward’s dissensus
politics was to practice what I have elsewhere called “radical incrementalism”:
to get what could be had while it could be had and to do so in ways that could
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lay the groundwork for future efforts. (On radical incrementalism, see Sanford
F. Schram, Praxis for the Poor: Piven and Cloward and the Future of Social Science in
Social Welfare [New York: New York University Press, 2002], 49–108.) One hopes
that we are starting to see these efforts as the country comes to grips with a
systematic marginalization of the poor that the Katrina disaster has so starkly
and painfully demonstrated.
Backlash against Welfare Mothers is an important, if not perfect, book. It perhaps
tries a bit too hard to go beyond Piven and Cloward when standing on their
shoulders would have been more than enough.
Sanford F. Schram
Bryn Mawr College
The Poorhouse: America’s Forgotten Institution. By David Wagner. Lanham,
MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005. Pp. 200. $60.00 (cloth); $22.95
(paper).
For a small volume, David Wagner’s The Poorhouse: America’s Forgotten Institution
has a hefty agenda. Over seven short chapters, Wagner sketches the story of the
fabled symbol of vulnerability and failure that for generations accumulated
America’s infirm, superannuated, and dispossessed while birthing specialized
institutions for child welfare, substance abuse treatment, and psychiatric, med-
ical, and geriatric care. In the last 20 pages (chap. 8), he turns to the contem-
porary relevance of this history, noting that the poorhouse endures, particularly
in the homeless shelter, nursing home, and county jail. This observation and
others will not be new to historically savvy students of poverty; there is not much
in The Poorhouse that escaped the notice of Michael Katz 20 years ago (see his
In the Shadow of the Poorhouse: A Social History of Welfare in America [New York:
Basic Books, 1986], 3–109). But Wagner makes the arresting claim that today’s
manifestations of the poorhouse might well be a lot worse than the genuine
article. On grounds of evidence and interpretation, I am not persuaded.
Reconstructing poorhouse history requires arduous excavation. Except for
published reports in which the voices of ordinary staff and inmates rarely are
heard, time has not been kind to institutional records: ancient bindings have
broken down and scattered their pages; flood, fire, and even earthquake have
destroyed records wholesale; in some cases, well-meaning advocates of confi-
dentiality systematically trashed them. Oral histories are of little help: very few
among us have any recollection of the daily routines of poorhouses, and these
hardy few are not a plausibly representative sample of historical experience. In
sum, the historian of social welfare institutions has more to go on than the
paleontologist, but the evidence typically is thin. To complicate matters, the
extreme localism of American social welfare created many variations on insti-
tutional forms. Thus, generalization about an institution like the poorhouse
requires careful comparative study, a method impeded quite seriously by fun-
damental evidentiary problems.
Like many who would give history an ethnographic turn, Wagner understands
but cannot transcend these obstacles. His accounts of six poorhouses in the
northern New England region—two in rural areas of New Hampshire, two in
small cities in Maine (Portland and Lewiston), and two in fair-sized Massachusetts
cities (Worcester and Haverhill)—rely on published documents, remaining frag-
ments of records, interviews with local elders who experienced the places, and
